Cross-cultural differences in intercultural mindreading: Evidence from a sample of Palestinian, Italian, and German adolescents by Hünefeldt, Thomas et al.
Cross-cultural differences in intercultural mindreading:
Evidence from a sample of Palestinian, Italian, and German
adolescents
Thomas Hünefeldt ,1 Ola Hussein,2 and Marta Olivetti Belardinelli1
1Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy, 2Al-Quds University, Jerusalem, Palestine
Abstract: Despite the fact that the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test (RMET) is now available in more than 20 languages, there are
only very few cross-cultural researchers using this test, and these researchers generally focus on North American versus East Asian cul-
tures. Considering that the RMET stimuli were selected and constructed in the United Kingdom, this research explored cross-cultural dif-
ferences in intercultural mindreading with a large sample of adolescents from Palestine (PAL), Italy (ITA), and Germany (GER). In
addition to significant main effects of age (younger < older) and gender (male < female), we found a significant main effect of country
(PAL < ITA < GER) and a significant interaction between gender and country. Individualism was not related to mindreading in any of
the three countries whereas collectivism was positively related in PAL, but not in ITA or GER, accounting only for a very small amount
of the variance. Our results suggest that (a) there may be cultural ingroup effects on mindreading, (b) the known female superiority in
mindreading may be moderated by cultural factors, and (c) depending on cultural factors, individualism and collectivism may be differ-
ently related to mindreading.
Keywords: age differences; collectivism; cultural differences; gender differences; individualism; theory of mind
Correspondence Dr. Thomas Hünefeldt, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy. Email: thomas.huenefeldt@uniroma1.it
Received 2 January 2020. Accepted 12 November 2020.
The ability to recognize mental states such as emotions,
desires, intentions, beliefs, and so on is an important
sociocognitive ability which has been referred to in a variety
of different ways, including “mentalization” (Fonagy, Gergely,
Jurist, & Target, 2002), “theory of mind” (Premack &
Woodruff, 1978), and “mindreading” (Whiten, 1991). This
ability comprises a large set of rather loosely related more spe-
cific abilities which mainly differ in terms of (a) the kinds of
individuals whose mental states are to be recognized
(e.g., oneself vs. others, human vs. nonhuman, etc.), (b) the
kinds of mental states that are to be recognized (e.g., simple
vs. complex, affective vs. cognitive, etc.), and (c) the cues by
means of which they are to be recognized (e.g., textual
vs. physical, bodily vs. environmental, etc.). In the research
presented here, we explore cross-cultural differences in a par-
ticular aspect of this ability; namely, the recognition of com-
plex mental states by means of facial cues displayed by other
human beings.
This particular aspect of the ability to recognize mental
states has so far been investigated mainly with the “Reading
the Mind in the Eyes” Test (RMET; Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe,
Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheel-
wright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). Unlike typical tests of
“emotion recognition,” the RMET does not assess the recog-
nition of relatively “simple” affective mental states such as
the so-called “basic emotions,” but it focuses on more
“complex” affective mental states such as doubtful, flirta-
tious, concerned, and so on; that is, on affective mental
states that are supposed to “involve the attribution of a belief
or an intention – a cognitive mental state – to the person”
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001, p. 243). And unlike other well-
established tests of complex mental state recognition such
as the Faux Pas Recognition Test (Stone, Baron-Cohen, &
Knight, 1998) or the Strange Stories test (Happé, 1994), the
RMET does not rely on textual cues but on a particular kind
of facial cues (for details, see the Instruments section).
© 2020 The Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
PsyCh Journal (2020)
DOI: 10.1002/pchj.417
As the RMET is by far the most frequently used test of
complex mental state recognition by means of facial cues,
we employed that test in the research presented here. Con-
sidering that the RMET stimuli had been selected and con-
structed in the United Kingdom, we wanted to explore
cross-cultural differences in intercultural mental state recog-
nition with a large sample of Palestinian, Italian, and
German adolescents. We chose adolescents rather than
adults mainly because they can be recruited almost as eas-
ily as university students, but they much better represent
the general population of their countries. In fact, enrollment
in the secondary education levels is 85% in Palestine and
100% in Italy and Germany whereas enrollment in ter-
tiary education levels is 42% in Palestine, 66% in Italy,
and 68% in Germany (UNdata, 2017). Furthermore, we
chose adolescents from these three countries for mainly
two reasons. First, Palestine, Italy, and Germany represent
one Arab versus two different European countries and one
Germanic versus two different Mediterranean countries,
which differ in several important respects, including their
geographical and cultural distance to the cultural context in
which the RMET stimuli were selected and constructed
(i.e., the United Kingdom). Second, Palestine, Italy, and
Germany are the native countries of the three authors of
this study. We are thus familiar with the culture of these
three countries, especially their languages and educational
institutions.
Given that we employed the RMET, we will formulate
our research questions and hypotheses with respect to per-
formance on that test, thereby using the term mindreading
as convenient shorthand for what is assessed by it. In par-
ticular, we investigate the following three questions: (1) Are
there cultural ingroup effects on mindreading? (2) Are the
known age and gender differences in mindreading moder-
ated by culture? (3) Is mindreading related to individual-
ism and collectivism? In the following sections, we will
introduce our research hypotheses based on a brief review
and discussion of the relevant scientific literature con-
cerning each of these three questions.
Are there cultural ingroup effects
on mindreading?
Despite the fact that the RMET is now available in more
than 20 languages, including several non-European ones,
there are very few cross-cultural studies using this test, all of
them with adult samples from Caucasian versus East Asian
national or ethnic groups (Adams et al., 2010; Bjornsdottir &
Rule, 2016; Franklin, Stevenson, Ambady, & Adams, 2015;
Lee et al., 2018; Prevost et al., 2014). These studies have
consistently found that mindreading accuracy was higher
when mental states were both expressed and recognized by
members of the same national or ethnic group, suggesting a
cultural ingroup effect on mindreading that is moderated by
the amount of exposure to the cultural outgroup. These find-
ings are consistent with the well-established results of
research on emotion recognition (Elfenbein, 2007, 2013,
2015; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Scherer,
Clark-Polner, & Mortillaro, 2011).
Based on the research on emotion recognition and
mindreading, we thus expected to find evidence of cultural
ingroup effects on mindreading in our study. In particular,
given that Italy and Germany are both geographically and
culturally much closer than Palestine to the cultural context
in which the RMET stimuli were selected and constructed
(i.e., the United Kingdom), we expected that both Germans
and Italians would score higher on that test than would Pal-
estinians. We furthermore expected that Germans would
tend to score higher than would Italians because Germany
is not only geographically but also culturally somewhat
closer to the United Kingdom than is Italy (De Santis,
Maltagliati, & Salvini, 2016). In fact, Germany and the
United Kingdom are both transalpine, Germanic-speaking
countries whereas Italy is a Mediterranean, Romance-lan-
guage-speaking country.
Are the known age and gender differences
in mindreading moderated by culture?
Mindreading is known to be affected by both age and gender.
In particular, there is consistent evidence that mindreading is
better in younger than in older adults (Henry, Phillips,
Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013) and in female than in male adults
(Kirkland, Peterson, Baker, Miller, & Pulos, 2013). Further-
more, the few studies investigating the effects of age and
gender on adolescents’ mindreading have provided evidence
of increasing mindreading abilities between early adoles-
cence and early adulthood (Hünefeldt, Laghi, Ortu, &
Olivetti Belardinelli, 2013; Vetter, Leipold, Kliegel, Phil-
lips, & Altgassen, 2013) and confirmed the female superior-
ity generally found in studies with adults (Hünefeldt et al.,
2013; Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2002).
However, it is an open question whether age and gender dif-
ferences in mindreading may be moderated by cultural vari-
ables. In fact, while potential interactions between culture
and age on mindreading have so far not been investigated,
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the only study investigating interactions between culture and
gender found neural, but no behavioral, evidence of such
interactions in a sample of U.S. American and Japanese uni-
versity students (Franklin et al., 2015).
In the absence of evidence from cross-cultural studies,
research on the effects of culture-specific age or gender
roles on mindreading could provide valuable suggestions as
to whether and how age and gender differences in
mindreading may be moderated by cultural variables. To
our knowledge, however, there is only one study that has
investigated the effects of gender roles on mindreading
whereas the effects of age roles on mindreading have thus
far not been investigated. Notably, the results of this study
suggest that the effects of gender roles extend beyond those
of anatomical sex with regard to social cognitive abilities
such as mindreading (Vonk, Mayhew, & Zeigler-Hill,
2016). In particular, feminine gender roles, as assessed by
the Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem, 1974), were consis-
tently a strong predictor of higher mindreading scores, even
when sex was controlled in the model. Supposing, then,
that mindreading may be affected by gender roles and per-
haps also by age roles, we expected that the moderating
effect of culture on the effects of age or gender on
mindreading would be stronger the more that two cultures
differ in their age or gender roles.
Regarding our sample of Palestinian, Italian, and Ger-
man adolescents, we expected that moderating effects of
culture would concern the effects of gender rather than
those of age. In fact, the difference between the age roles
of younger and older adolescents is likely to be rather simi-
lar in all three countries whereas the difference between
male and female gender roles, as assessed by gender-
equality indices such as the Equality subindex of the World
Value Survey (Inglehart et al., 2014), the Global Gender
Gap Report (2018), and the Gender Inequality Index
(2017), is known to be much larger in Arab than in
European countries. We therefore expected that gender dif-
ferences in mindreading would be smaller in Italians and
Germans than in Palestinians.
Is mindreading related to individualism and
collectivism?
Cultures differ not only on external variables such as geo-
graphical location and political institutions but also on inter-
nal variables such as values (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Inglehart
et al., 2014). In cross-cultural psychology, the distinction
between individualistic and collectivistic values has been
particularly influential, but the constructs of individualism
and collectivism have been conceptualized in a large variety
of different ways (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002;
Taras et al., 2014; Voronov & Singer, 2002). It would there-
fore not be surprising to find a rather large variety of hypoth-
eses and predictions concerning the relationship between
individualism and collectivism on one hand, and the ability
to recognize mental states on the other hand. However, to
our knowledge, only two different kinds of hypotheses and
predictions have been made so far.
Following Matsumoto (1989, 1992), Elfenbein and
Ambady (2003) argued that “individualist cultures show
lower concern about the possible negative consequences of
recognizing negative emotions that are potentially damaging
to social relationships, and so should not attenuate such com-
munication” (p. 94). They therefore hypothesized that “indi-
vidualism is associated with the more accurate perception of
negative emotions but not with the more accurate perception
of positive or neutral emotions” (p. 94). However, the results
of their meta-analysis on cross-cultural differences in emo-
tion recognition did not support this hypothesis.
Vu, Finkenauer, Huizinga, Novin, and Krabbendam
(2017), however, argued that “collectivism is associated
with other-oriented cognition, emotion, and motivation,
while individualism is associated with self-oriented cogni-
tion, emotion, and motivation” (p. 3/20). They therefore
predicted that “collectivism, compared to individualism,
might entail faster recognition and more accurate under-
standing of the thoughts and feelings of other people”
(p. 3/20). Backed up by a brief review of research investi-
gating the effects of individualism and collectivism on the-
ory of mind, they further hypothesized that the predicted
effect would be found not only at the country level but also
at both the individual level and the situational level, with
possible interactions between these levels. However, using
both the original Caucasian and the East Asian version of
the Reading the Mind in Eyes test, they failed to find evi-
dence of the predicted effects.
A possible reason why neither Elfenbein and Ambady
(2003) nor Vu et al. (2017) found evidence in favor of their
respective hypotheses might be the fact that both groups of
researchers assessed individualism and collectivism too
broadly. In fact, Elfenbein and Ambady (2003) considered
individualism and collectivism at the country level using
Hofstede’s (2001) unidimensional individualism–collectivism
values whereas Vu et al. assessed individualism and collectiv-
ism at both the country and the individual levels via a single
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individualism–collectivism ratio. As the overly broad ways in
which individualism and collectivism are defined and
assessed has been repeatedly criticized (Oyserman et al.,
2002; Taras et al., 2014; Voronov & Singer, 2002), a more
fine-tuned, differential approach to investigating their rela-
tionship with the ability to recognize mental states is
called for.
In the research presented here, we therefore employed a
measure that considers individualism and collectivism as
two independent dimensions. In particular, we employed
the Auckland Individualism and Collectivism Scale (AICS;
Shulruf et al., 2011; Shulruf, Hattie, & Dixon, 2007),
which conceives individualism in terms of valuing personal
competitiveness, uniqueness and responsibility, and collec-
tivism in terms of valuing interpersonal advice and har-
mony (for details, see the Instruments section). Given this
way of conceiving individualism and collectivism, we
expected that the AICS scores of individualism (IND) and
collectivism (COL) would be differently related to
mindreading and that COL rather than IND would be related
to mindreading in the ways predicted by the aforementioned
hypotheses. Based on Elfenbein and Ambady’s (2003)
hypothesis, we expected that mindreading would tend to be
negatively related with COL because COL assesses the
value of interpersonal harmony that is supposed to be asso-
ciated with a less accurate perception of negative mental
states. Based on Vu et al.’s (2017) hypothesis, by contrast,
we expected that mindreading would tend to be positively
related with COL because COL assesses the other-related
processing that is supposed to be associated with more accu-
rate understanding of the thoughts and feelings of other peo-
ple. As neither of these two hypotheses refers to conditions
of age and culture, we further expected that the predicted
effects would be observed cross-culturally regardless of age.
Methods
Participants
For this study, 596 adolescents were recruited at public
schools located in urban neighborhoods in Palestine (East
Jerusalem), Central Italy (Rome), and Northern Germany
(Bremen). These three countries differ on a variety of socio-
economic variables, including affluence, education level,
and family size, with Palestinian adolescents generally liv-
ing in less affluent, less educated, and larger families than
Italian or German adolescents (cf. UNdata, 2017). Though
the education systems in these three countries are hardly
comparable, we took care to select schools that were similar
in that they were all tuition-free, thus fairly well representing
the general population, and in that they covered different
educational profiles (e.g., technical, scientific, linguistic,
etc.), potentially leading to final degrees that allow admis-
sion to all kinds of public universities in the country. Apart
from age and gender, we were unable to obtain individual
demographic information from the participants.
In addition to two gender groups (male and female), we
defined two age groups: 14–16 years and 17–19 years. The
cut-off point was chosen mainly to obtain age groups of
roughly the same size. However, in all three countries, the
younger group included exclusively students attending com-
pulsory secondary education classes whereas the older
group included mainly students attending voluntary second-
ary education classes. As the age and gender distributions in
the subsamples of Palestinian, Italian, and German adoles-
cents were not balanced, we randomly selected participants
from these three subsamples to obtain age- and gender-
balanced subsamples. The remaining sample consisted of
499 adolescents (see Table 1). Chi-square tests confirmed
that the three subsamples did not differ in their distribution
by age and gender, Χ2(2, N = 499) = .003, p = .96.
Instruments
Revised adult RMET
The RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) is a well-established
test of advanced mental state recognition that has been suc-
cessfully used not only with adults but also with adoles-
cents in both clinical and nonclinical studies (e.g., Fossati,
Feeney, Maffei, & Borroni, 2014; Naor-Ziv & Glicksohn,
2016; Vetter et al., 2013). It consists of 36 black-and-white
photographs featuring the eye region of 18 male and
18 female Caucasian posers. Each photograph is associated
with four mental state terms: one target and three foils (for
an example of a RMET stimulus, see Figure 1). Perfor-
mance on the RMET is generally assessed in terms of the
number of correctly recognized test items. Accordingly, the
total score ranges from 0 to 36, with a score of 9 rep-
resenting chance level.
Notably, the photographs used in the RMET were taken
from commercial magazines available to the British authors
of the test. The mental state terms (target and foils) were
generated by the first two authors. The target terms were
eventually established on the basis of consensus of a large
population (N = 225) consisting of normal British adults
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drawn from community and education classes in Exeter,
from public library users in Cambridge, and from under-
graduate students at Cambridge University. For an item to
be included in the test, at least 50% of the subjects had to
select the target and no more than 25% could select any
one of the foils.
Regarding its psychometric properties (for a review and
additional evidence, see Olderbak et al., 2015), the RMET
typically has acceptable test–retest reliability (e.g., Hallerbäck,
Lugnegård, Hjärthag, & Gillberg, 2009; Khorashad et al.,
2015; Prevost et al., 2014; Vellante et al., 2013), but poor
internal consistency. For example, Cronbach’s α was found to
be .48 for the English version (Ragsdale & Foley, 2011), .60
for an Italian version (Vellante et al., 2013), .53 for a French
version (Prevost et al., 2014), and .37 for a Persian version
(Khorashad et al., 2015). As suggested by Olderbak et al.
(2015), the low internal consistency may be due to various test
attributes, regarding both the photographs (kinds of mental
states expressed, angle of face, ratio of dark and light, etc.)
and the mental state terms (commonness, frequency, and dis-
tribution of the response-option words). Despite these limita-
tions, the RMET can successfully differentiate between
groups presumed to differ in their ability to recognize mental
states, showing evidence of discriminant validity with mea-
sures of autistic traits (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Evidence of
convergent validity with other standard measures of mental
state recognition is somewhat mixed (Olderbak et al., 2015),
maybe due to the fact that other measures assess other aspects
of this complex ability (e.g., mental state recognition by
means of textual or environmental rather than facial cues). In
fact, as emphasized by various authors, there is no gold stan-
dard against which to validate it (e.g., Hallerbäck et al., 2009;
Prevost et al., 2014; Vellante et al., 2013).
In the current study, we used an Arabic, an Italian, and a
German version of the RMET with the Palestinian, Italian,
and German sample, respectively. The Italian version has
been validated in an extensive psychometric study
(Vellante et al., 2013). The German version (Bölte, 2005)
has demonstrated its validity in a number of clinical studies
(e.g., Kother et al., 2012; Schilling et al., 2012). It has been
authorized by the Autism Research Centre at the University
of Cambridge and is one of the standard tests available on
its website. The Arab version has been translated for the
purpose of this study by using the standard back-translation
method, coordinated and supervised by the second author
of this study, who is a native Arabic speaker. In line with
Table 1
Final Sample Distribution by Age, Gender, and Country
14–16 Years 17–19 Years Total
n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD)
Palestinians
Male 50 15.4 (0.5) 47 17.3 (0.5) 97 16.3 (1.1)
Female 51 15.3 (0.7) 49 17.6 (0.6) 100 16.4 (1.3)
Total N 101 15.3 (0.6) 96 17.4 (0.6) 197 16.4 (1.2)
Italians
Male 46 15.5 (0.7) 44 17.7 (0.8) 90 16.6 (1.3)
Female 47 15.2 (0.7) 45 17.7 (0.8) 92 16.4 (1.4)
Total N 93 15.4 (0.7) 89 17.7 (0.8) 182 16.5 (1.4)
Germans
Male 30 15.1 (0.9) 29 18.1 (0.9) 59 16.6 (1.8)
Female 31 15.2 (0.8) 30 17.8 (0.9) 61 16.5 (1.6)
Total N 61 15.1 (0.9) 59 17.9 (0.9) 120 16.5 (1.7)
Total
Male 126 15.4 (0.7) 120 17.8 (0.8) 246 16.5 (1.4)
Female 129 15.3 (0.7) 124 17.7 (0.7) 253 16.4 (1.4)
Total N 255 15.3 (0.7) 244 17.7 (0.8) 499 16.5 (1.4)
Figure 1. Example of a Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test stimulus.
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the results of previous studies (Khorashad et al., 2015;
Prevost et al., 2014; Ragsdale & Foley, 2011; Vellante
et al., 2013), the internal consistency was rather low in all
three versions; Italian sample: α = .70, Palestinian sample:
α = .56, German sample α = .43.
AICS
The AICS (Shulruf et al., 2011; Shulruf et al., 2007) is a
short and easy-to-use measurement tool for individualism
and collectivism that is based on an extensive meta-analysis
of studies on this topic (Oyserman et al., 2002) and that
has been found to be highly reliable and valid across a
large range of cultures (Shulruf et al., 2011). It consists of
26 items related to two facets of collectivism: advice (seek-
ing advice from people close to oneself, before making
decisions) and harmony (seeking to avoid conflict), and
three facets of individualism: competitiveness (striving for
personal goals is one’s prime interest), uniqueness (distinc-
tion of the self from the other), and responsibility
(acknowledging one’s responsibility for one’s actions). Par-
ticipants are requested to rate on a 6-point Likert scale of
1 (Never) to 6 (Always) how often they would think or
behave as described in the test items.
In the current study, we used the existing Italian version
(Shulruf et al., 2011) with the Italian sample. With the Ger-
man and the Palestinian samples, we used a German and an
Arab version that we translated for the purpose of this study
by using the standard back-translation method. Participants’
individualism and collectivism were assessed in terms of their
mean scores of IND and COL. In all three samples, internal
reliability of the scales was satisfactory for both IND (PAL: α
= .74, ITA: α = .74, GER: α = .77) and COL (PAL: α = .69,
ITA: α = .66, GER: α = .72). However, IND and COL were
uncorrelated only in the Italian and the German samples
whereas they were positively correlated in the Palestinian sam-
ple, r = .243, p = .001, two-tailed, suggesting that the con-
structs might not be fully equivalent in the three samples.
Procedure
After obtaining ethical approval from the review board
of Sapienza University of Rome and from local school
authorities, we obtained informed consent from the ado-
lescent participants and their parents. The RMET and the
AICS were administered in the adolescents’ classrooms
during regular class time, in the presence of their teacher.
The same procedure was used in all classrooms.
Participants received a booklet containing the RMET and
AICS instructions and answer sheets. They were asked to
read through the RMET instructions, the experimenter
explained the test procedure with an example of a prac-
tice stimulus, and participants were given the opportunity
to ask questions. The experimenter emphasized that the
test must be taken individually and in silence. Once there
were no more questions, participants were asked to fol-
low the RMET instructions, and then RMET stimuli were
presented on a large screen. Each stimulus was presented
for 25 s, followed by a blank slide presented for 5 s.
Immediately following the RMET, the AICS was admin-
istered. Participants were asked to read through the AICS
instructions and to ask questions about the procedure.
Once there were no more questions, participants were
asked to follow the AICS instructions and to complete
the AICS individually and in silence. On average, it took
~40 to 45 min to administer the two tests. Afterwards,
participants and their teacher discussed the research with
the experimenter. In general, participants were eager to
learn about the research and provided positive feedback.
Design and statistical analyses
To address our first two research questions (Are there cul-
tural ingroup effects on mindreading? Are the known age
and gender differences in mindreading moderated by cul-
ture?), we performed an analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with Age (younger vs. older), Gender (male vs. female),
and Country (Palestine vs. Italy vs. Germany) as between-
subject factors on the participants’ RMET scores. To test
our hypotheses concerning our third research question
(Is mindreading related to individualism and collectiv-
ism?), we performed for each of the three samples a Pear-
son correlation analysis between the participants’ RMET
scores, on one hand, and their AICS scores of IND and
COL, on the other. In addition to these main analyses, we
performed two supplementary analyses to assess if and in
how far the country differences evidenced by the main
analyses could be due to country-level differences in indi-
vidualism or collectivism. In particular, we first performed
a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with
Country (Palestine vs. Italy vs. Germany) as the between-
subject factor on the AICS scores of IND and COL, and
second, a hierarchical regression analysis including Age,
Gender, Country, IND, and COL as predictors of
mindreading. All statistical analyses were performed using
SPSS Statistics Version 19 (IBM, Armonk, NY).
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Results
Effects of age, gender, and country
on mindreading
The ANOVA with Age (younger vs. older), Gender (male
vs. female), and Country (Palestine vs. Italy vs. Germany)
as between-subject factors on the participants’ RMET
scores evidenced significant main effects of Age, Gender,
and Country as well as a significant two-way interaction
between Gender and Country whereas the other interactions
were not statistically significant (see Table 2).
Regarding the significant main effects of Age and Gen-
der, older adolescents (M = 25.5, SE = 0.3) scored higher
than younger adolescents (M = 23.9, SE = 0.3), and
females (M = 26.0, SE = 0.2) scoring higher than males
(M = 23.3, SE = 0.3).
For the significant main effect of Country, pairwise compar-
isons revealed that Palestinians (M = 22.6, SE = 0.3) scored
significantly lower than both Italians (M = 25.6, SE = 0.3),
p < .001, and Germans (M = 26.7, SE = 0.3), p < .001, with
Italians scoring significantly lower than Germans, p < .05.
For the significant interaction between Gender and Country
(see Figure 2), a follow-up ANOVA revealed that in all three
countries, females scored significantly higher than males, but
the gender difference was much smaller in Palestinians,
p < .05, than in Italians, p < .001, and Germans, p < .001.
Relation of mindreading to individualism and
collectivism
Results of the Pearson correlation analyses between
mindreading, as assessed by the RMET, and individualism
and collectivism, as assessed by the AISC scores of IND
and COL, in the three samples of Palestinian, Italian, and
German adolescents are reported in Table 3. As evident
from the table, the correlation patterns differed substantially
between the Palestinian sample on one hand, and the Ital-
ian and German samples on the other hand. In the Palestin-
ian sample, RMET was positively correlated with COL
whereas its correlation with IND was not statistically
Table 2
Results of the Analysis of Variance with Age, Gender, and Country as Between-Subject Variables on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test
Predictor df SS MS F p ηp2
(Intercept) 1 296720.76 296720.76 25687.46 .000
Age 1 225.33 225.33 19.51* .000 .039
Gender 1 864.15 864.15 74.81* .000 .133
Country 2 1475.77 737.89 63.88* .000 .208
Age × Gender 1 0.44 0.44 0.04 .845 .000
Age × Country 2 64.33 32.17 2.78 .063 .011
Gender × Country 2 262.08 131.04 11.34* .000 .045
Age × Gender × Country 2 33.95 16.97 1.47 .231 .006
Error 487 5625.43 11.55
Note. SS = sums of squares; MS = mean squares.
*p < .001.
Figure 2. Mean Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test scores of male and
female Palestinian, Italian, and German participants. Vertical bars denote
SEs. *p < .05. ***p < .001.
Table 3
Results of the Pearson Correlation Analyses between RMET and the AICS
Scores of IND and COL in the Palestinian, Italian, and German Samples
Sample Variable M SD 1 2
Palestinian 1. IND 4.25 0.67
2. COL 3.92 0.74 .243*
3. RMET 22.61 3.77 .126 .220*
Italian 1. IND 3.90 0.70
2. COL 3.57 0.69 −0.75
3. RMET 25.57 4.26 −.102 .59
German 1. IND 4.20 0.65
2. COL 3.51 0.74 .75
3. RMET 26.74 3.03 −.114 −.010
Note. RMET = Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; AICS = Auckland Individ-
ualism and Collectivism Scale; IND = individualism; COL = collectivism.
*p < .01, two-tailed.
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significant. In the Italian and German samples, by contrast,
neither IND nor COL was significantly correlated
with RMET.
Effect of Country on individualism and
collectivism
The MANOVA with Country (Palestinian vs. Italian
vs. German) as the between-subjects factor on the AICS
scores of IND and COL evidenced significant main effects
on both IND, F(2, 496) = 13.6, p < .001, ηp2 = .05, and
COL, F(2, 496) = 16.1, p < .001, ηp2 = .06. Pairwise com-
parisons revealed that IND was significantly lower in Ital-
ians (M = 3.90, SE = 0.05) than in Palestinians (M = 4.25,
SE = 0.05), p < .001, and Germans (M = 4.20, SE = 0.06),
p < .01, whereas it did not differ significantly between Pal-
estinians and Germans. By contrast, COL was significantly
higher in Palestinians (M = 3.92, SE = 0.05) than in Italians
(M = 3.57, SE = 0.05), p < .001, and Germans (M = 3.51,
SE = 0.06), p < .001, whereas it did not differ significantly
between Italians and Germans.
Individualism and collectivism as predictors
of mindreading
Results of the hierarchical regression analysis predicting
mindreading, as assessed by the RMET, in our sample of Pal-
estinian, Italian, and German adolescents are reported in Table
4. Age and Gender were entered as categorical variables in the
first block. In the second block, we entered the two-level cate-
gorical country variables “European” (0 = no, 1 = yes) and
“Germanic” (0 = no, 1 = yes), thus dummy-coding our three-
level country variable for the scope of the regression. In the
third block, we entered the AICS scores of IND and COL.
As evident from Table 4, the whole model accounted for
31.3% of the variance. Age and Gender alone accounted
for 13.5% of the variance. The two country variables
accounted for 17.2% of the variance, strongly increasing
the fit of the model, p < .001. Finally, IND and COL
accounted only for 0.5% of the variance without signifi-
cantly increasing the fit of the model. In the overall model,
Age, Gender, and both country variables were significantly
related to mindreading whereas the effects of IND and
COL were not statistically significant.
Discussion
We introduced our hypotheses in the context of three ques-
tions that we wanted to address in the research presented
here. Accordingly, we will discuss our results with refer-
ence to these three questions.
Are there cultural ingroup effects on
mindreading?
As predicted, both Italians and Germans scored higher on
the RMET than Palestinians, and Germans scored higher
Table 4
Results of the Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Mindreading
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 ΔF
Model 1 – – – .135 .135 38.8**
(Intercept) 22.59 0.30 – – – –
Age (0 = younger, 1 = older) 1.52 0.35 0.18** – – –
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 2.65 0.35 0.32** – – –
Model 2 .308 .172 61.5**
(Intercept) 20.53 0.33 – – – –
Age (0 = younger, 1 = older) 1.51 0.31 0.18** – – –
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 2.66 0.31 0.32** – – –
European (0 = no, 1 = yes) 2.96 0.36 0.35** – – –
Germanic (0 = no, 1 = yes) 1.16 0.41 0.12* – – –
Model 3 – – – .313 .005 1.8
(Intercept) 19.65 1.28 –
Age (0 = younger, 1 = older) 1.52 0.31 0.18** – – –
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 2.60 0.31 0.31** – – –
European (0 = no, 1 = yes) 3.05 0.37 0.36** – – –
Germanic (0 = no, 1 = yes) 1.23 0.41 0.13* – – –
IND −0.16 0.23 −0.03 – – –
COL 0.40 0.22 0.07 – – –
Note. IND = individualism; COL = collectivism.
*p < .01. **p < .001.
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than Italians, confirming the hypothesis that there are cul-
tural ingroup effects on mindreading. To be sure, the find-
ings potentially admit alternative explanations, as we used
translations of the original RMET constructed in the United
Kingdom and did not check whether analogous effects
would be found using ethnic versions of the RMET, with
stimuli selected and constructed in Palestine, Italy, and Ger-
many, respectively. However, there are at least two circum-
stances that let alternative explanations appear less
parsimonious. First, we found that all three predicted
effects; that is, we found the predicted effect concerning
Europeans versus Palestinians with two different European
samples (one from Germany and the other from Italy), and
we also found the predicted effect concerning Germans ver-
sus Italians. Second, the observed effects could not be
accounted for in terms of the value dimensions that are
most often referred to that would account for cultural dif-
ferences (i.e., in terms of individualism and collectivism).
Overall, the hypothesized cultural ingroup effects on
mindreading seem therefore to be the most parsimonious
explanation of the observed effects.
On a critical note, note that the dichotomic distinctions
between ingroups and outgroups are actually rather arbi-
trary and ambiguous because they depend on choosing one
often fuzzy reference category rather than some other cate-
gory (e.g., “Caucasian” rather than “European”). Another,
perhaps more appropriate way to account for cross-cultural
differences might be to use measures of cultural distance.
Unfortunately, however, comprehensive measures of cul-
tural distance are available thus far only for a rather limited
number of culture-bearing units, such as European coun-
tries (De Santis et al., 2016).
Are the known age and gender differences
in mindreading moderated by culture?
As predicted, the moderating effects of culture concerned
the effects of gender rather than those of age. In fact, only
the effects of gender, but not those of age, differed signifi-
cantly between Palestinians, Italians, and Germans. How-
ever, our expectation that gender differences in mindreading
would be smaller in Italians and Germans than in Pal-
estinians was not confirmed. Contrary to our expectations,
in fact, gender differences in mindreading were smaller in
Palestinians than in Italians and Germans.
Nevertheless, this unexpected result does not necessarily
falsify our hypothesis that larger differences in gender roles
are associated with larger gender differences in mindreading.
In fact, there seem to be at least three ways to explain the dis-
crepancy between predicted and observed results. First, the
gender-equality measures we employed to assess differences
in gender roles might not capture those aspects of gender
roles that affect mindreading. In fact, gender-equality mea-
sures typically assess either subjective opinions or objective
facts about economic, political, and educational gender
equality, but do not directly assess gender roles concerning
interpersonal behavior. Second, supposing that gender-
equality measures appropriately reflect the relevant differ-
ences in gender roles, gender roles might rather affect
ingroup than outgroup mindreading. In fact, gender roles
concerning interpersonal behavior are likely to determine
experience and expertise with ingroup rather than with out-
group people. Finally, cultural bias toward the target culture
(United Kingdom) might negatively affect mindreading in
both male and female adolescents, and due to larger cultural
distance, it might be stronger in Palestinians than in Italians
or Germans, so that gender differences are not so obvious.
In any case, our results provide the first behavioral evi-
dence that the effects of gender on mindreading may be
moderated by cultural variables. However, more research is
needed to better understand the mechanisms underlying the
moderating effect of cultural variables, especially the role
of gender roles and outgroup bias within and across
cultures.
Is mindreading related to individualism
and collectivism?
Any interpretation of our results concerning the relation of
mindreading to individualism and collectivism is limited by
the fact that the constructs of IND and COL might not be
fully equivalent in the three samples because they were
uncorrelated only in the Italian and the German samples,
but positively correlated in the Palestinian sample (see the
Instruments section). Keeping this limitation in mind, our
results partly confirm our expectation that IND and COL
would be differently related to mindreading and that rather
COL than IND would be related to mindreading, but they
contradict our expectation that the effects of IND and COL
on mindreading would be observed in each of our three
samples. In fact, we found that COL was related to
mindreading only in the Palestinian sample, but unrelated
in the Italian and German samples, whereas IND was
unrelated in all three samples.
Given that mindreading was positively correlated with
COL in the Palestinian sample, our results do not support
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the prediction based on Elfenbein and Ambady’s (2003)
hypothesis, according to which mindreading would tend to
be negatively correlated with COL whereas they confirm
the prediction based on Vu et al.’s (2017) hypothesis,
according to which mindreading would tend to be positively
correlated with COL. However, as it stands, Vu et al.’s
hypothesis does not account for cross-cultural differences in
the relation between COL and mindreading. Our finding that
COL was positively correlated with mindreading only in the
Palestinian sample, but unrelated in the Italian and German
samples, needs therefore to be explained in terms of some
additional factor.
Vu et al. (2017) themselves suggested that potential
cross-cultural differences in the relation between COL and
mindreading might be due to country-level differences in
COL. Given that in our study Palestinians scored overall
higher on COL than Italians or Germans, our finding that
COL was positively correlated with mindreading only in
the Palestinian sample might therefore be explained in
terms of country-level differences in COL. However, there
seems to be no straightforward reason for why the relation
between COL and mindreading should be more evident at
higher country-level COL.
Overall, our results thus suggest that mindreading is
related rather to collectivistic than to individualistic values
and that this relation is moderated by cultural variables; how-
ever, more research is needed to better understand the under-
lying mechanisms. In particular, future research should
investigate the effects of specific individualistic and collec-
tivistic values on mindreading within and across cultures.
Conclusion
Overall, our results suggest that (a) there are cultural
ingroup effects on mindreading; (b) the female superiority
in mindreading is moderated by cultural factors; and
(c) depending on cultural factors, individualism and collec-
tivism may be differently related to mindreading. However,
in addition to the specific limitations already mentioned in
the Discussion, we note four more general limitations of
our study. First, our results were obtained with adolescent
samples and therefore cannot be easily generalized to
adults, even though there seem to be no straightforward
reasons to expect different results with adults. Second,
though we took care that our samples fairly well represen-
ted the general population, we were unable to obtain
individual demographic information besides age and gen-
der, so we could not control for potentially confounding
factors such as socioeconomic status. Third, the RMET is a
rather imperfect measure of the ability it assesses, as
evidenced by its cross-culturally poor internal consistency
and unclear convergent validity. Finally, our results concern
intercultural mindreading; namely, how well adolescents
from three different countries recognize the mental states
displayed in the eyes of people from a fourth country.
Accordingly, they cannot simply be generalized to
intracultural mindreading. Despite these limitations, our
study provides a number of interesting new results that can
give important indications for future research.
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